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The distance metric on the location space for multidimensional public good
varieties represents complementarity between the good￿ s features. "Euclid-
ean" feature complementarity has atypical strong properties that lead to a
failure of intuition about the optimal-menu design problem. If the population
is heterogeneous, increasing the distance between two varieties is welfare-
improving in Euclidean space, but not generally. A basic optimal-direction
principle always applies: "anticonvex" menu changes increase participation
and surplus. A menu replacement is anticonvex if it moves the varieties apart
in the common line space. The result extends to some impure public goods
with break-even pricing and variety-speci￿c costs. A su¢ cient condition for
menus to be Pareto-optimal is that "personal price" (nominal price plus per-
ceived distance from a variety) is linear in the norm that induces the distance
metric.
JEL Codes: H41, D78, D71, R13, R12Although public goods are nominally free, demand (for most) is limited
in practice. Selective participation re￿ ects non-price costs (time and travel
requirements) and the diversity of tastes. Many public goods are o⁄ered in
varieties to appeal to di⁄erent patrons. For example, library branches and
parks are established in several neighborhoods to meet the location prefer-
ences of dwellers throughout the city. But physical place is often not the only
dimension on which varieties are distinct. Libraries may have a unique genre
focus and a quaint or modern atmosphere; parks o⁄er their own wildlife and
plant life. These features can also be thought of as locations in an abstract
space, so that the typical variety is a point in a multidimensional space.
Suppose the population is very heterogeneous: everyone favors a di⁄erent
mix of features; in fact, every point in a vector space is associated with
exactly one person who desires the corresponding design. There seems to
be an obvious solution to the variety location problem: a diverse population
is best served by a diverse menu. A change is welfare-improving whenever
it increases the spatial dispersion of varieties. We demonstrate that this
intuition is wrong. Even when there are only two varieties, it is sometimes
bene￿cial to make them more similar (reduce their perceived distance). The
reason is that closer varieties, with respect to non-Euclidean distance, may
attract participation from a larger subset of the population.
The metric of perceived distance determines feature complementarity in
a multidimensional design space. There is no special reason why preferences
should be represented by a Euclidean space. Euclidean features are one of
many intermediate cases between perfect substitute and perfect complement
features. To explain this perspective and derive a fundamental "optimal
direction" result that isn￿ t sensitive to feature complementarity (choice of
metric) are the main contributions of the paper.
Speci￿cally, with two neighboring varieties and personal consumption re-
stricted to the most preferred, a move to a convex combination of the design
loci reduces participation and consumer surplus. An anticonvex move (away
1from each other in the line space containing the designs) increases both.1 The
surprising aspect is that stronger statements are false when feature comple-
mentarity is non-Euclidean. Moving the varieties apart in distance (in an
arbitrary direction) may be detrimental.
It may seem that any menu change is Pareto optimal when each variety
has a patron (since it bene￿ts the type who ideally prefers the new design).
Although this reasoning is accurate for pure public goods, it does not ex-
tend to all "impure" public goods, which may have nonzero, non-uniform
break-even prices. We obtain a su¢ cient condition: an arrangement where
every variety has nonzero participation is e¢ cient when the "personal price"
(nominal price plus distance from the variety) is linear in a p-norm.2
Our restrictions on individual demand are comparatively weak; they cover
a family of linear and nonlinear functions that are monotonic in personal
distance from a variety. In our choice of welfare measures we depart from the
social choice approach, where one would derive a class of acceptable decision
rules axiomatically. Surveys about potential use, estimates of surplus, and
the existence of a lobby are the kinds of data that are potentially available to
policymakers. Thus participation, consumer surplus, and Pareto e¢ ciency
are important in actual public good provision.
Alternative metrics have been explored axiomatically in bargaining and
social choice theory. Lehrer and Nitzan [6] asked when a given choice rule
could be "rationalized" by a metric on preference pro￿les.3 The class of
admissible rules may be further restricted by imposing axioms on the met-
ric. For example, P￿ngsten and Wagener [11] derive axioms that induce the
1By participation we mean cumulative use frequency, rather than the number of users.
If a person visits a festival twice, then participation increases by two. Nevertheless, the
result would also apply to the user-count de￿nition of participation.
2The restriction is violated by the quadratic distance cost model, which is popular in
spatial economics.
3Consider the set of consensus pro￿les that unanimously prefer some allocation. An al-
location is rationalized by a metric if it is elected by a consensus pro￿le that is closest to the
actual pro￿le in terms of the metric. Metric rationalizability of a choice rule is equivalent
to the Paretian property (if an allocation is preferred by all, then it is implemented).
2p-metrics; Conley et al. [1] and Voorneveld and van den Nouweland [12] char-
acterize the Euclidean metric (p = 2).4 Our approach provides a di⁄erent
and non-normative interpretation of alternate p-metrics. Here they relate to
the complementarity of decision criteria that jointly determine preference.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 1 we discuss an example
of the setting we have in mind, show that it has a geometric representation
and a natural role for metrics as models of feature complementarity. It is
important that the reader become familiar with the geometry of the perfect
substitutes case in this section, as we often cite it later on. Section 2 de￿nes
a more general class of problems that is characterized by the same geometry
and contains the example from Section 1.
If an isolated variety moves in the design space, participation and sur-
plus are una⁄ected. This intuitive proposition is veri￿ed in Section 3. It
provides a simple graphic argument for the non-neutrality of welfare with
respect to locations of neighboring varieties. The argument appears in Sec-
tion 4, together with the optimal direction theorem. The theorem covers
pure public goods (that are free) and impure public goods (with positive but
non-strategic prices). Personal prices are assumed to be linear. Under this
condition, menus with nonzero participation (in all varieties) are found to be
Pareto-e¢ cient in Section 5; we show how the proof fails otherwise. Section
6 concludes and connects to strands of social choice theory and industrial
economics.
4Related to metric rationalizability are research designs that exploit the duality between
social choice problems and multicriteria optimization. Conley et al. and Voorneveld / van
den Nouweland utilize this framework. The problem is to balance multiple objectives when
it is not possible to maximize with respect to each simultaneously. The metric aggregates
shortfalls in component objectives, and the least costly solution in this sense is chosen.
31 Feature Complementarity in a Spatial Model
of Demand
When patrons must choose among designs with multiple attributes, they
will weigh a close ￿t with their tastes in one respect against disagreement
in another. Sometimes there is a natural way to do this. In comparing tax
systems, voters are concerned with the total they must pay; they should be
willing to trade a higher income tax against a lower property tax dollar-for-
dollar. Hence the components of a tax system are perfect substitutes. When
it comes to government spending proposals, many voters have ethical priors
that result in a perfect complements mentality. Suppose the issue is how to
allocate funds between health care and unemployment bene￿ts. Often the
policies are ranked by comparing the least acceptable element of each.
Consider two churches, of which one o⁄ers a dull sermon and an excellent
choir, whereas the other has an inspiring pastor and mediocre singing by
the congregation. A music enthusiast may prefer the former if he is willing
to sit through (substitute) the sermon for the enjoyment of the choir. But
if he tends to drowsiness, he may attend the latter service, as it satis￿es
the minimal requirement of keeping him awake to experience the music. In
this example, the patron￿ s choice reveals whether preaching and music are
regarded as substitutes or complements.
Technically, preference is determined by how perceived distance from a
variety is constructed from distances in single dimensions - in other words, it
depends on the metric. One can appreciate visually that di⁄erent metrics re-
￿ ect di⁄erent degrees of complementarity between features. We assume here
and throughout the paper that "types" (personally ideal designs) constitute
a normed vector space (Rn;k￿k), or equivalently:
(A1) Types are continuously and uniformly distributed on Rn,
n ￿ 2.
4(A2) "Perceived distance" between types x and y is kx ￿ yk,
where k￿k is a norm.


















The spaces associated with these norms are the Lp spaces. We often re-
fer to the extremes L1 and L1 (as we shall see these are, respectively, the
"perfect substitutes" and "perfect complements" cases), and to the famil-
iar Euclidean space L2. The reader is reminded that p = 1 corresponds
to the max norm kxk1 ￿ maxi￿n jxij and thus induces the max metric
d1 (x;y) ￿ maxi￿n jxi ￿ yij.
With (A1) and (A2) in place, one can de￿ne an r-ball about the point a:
B (a;r) = fx : kx ￿ ak ￿ rg. This is the set of types who ￿nd their preferred
bundle of features is no farther than a distance r from a. Figure 1 plots this
set in two dimensions for L1, L2, L1, together with an intermediate case
between p = 2 and p = 1.
Since distance from a is constant along the boundary of B (a;r), jx2 ￿ a2j
must decrease one-for-one with increases in jx1 ￿ a1j when the norm is k￿k1,
or stay ￿xed while jx1 ￿ a1j increases when the norm is k￿k1 and jx1 ￿ a1j <
jx2 ￿ a2j. Hence the types treat deviations from the ideal point as perfect
substitutes in L1 and as perfect complements in L1 (where only a reduction
of the worst deviation makes a di⁄erence).
This interpretation of metrics has economic content when a ball in Lp
is related to demand. For the moment we use a simple example. The next
5Figure 1: An r-ball with respect to some p-norms
section develops a more general setting for our analysis. Let the optimal
quantity (or frequency of use) for type x of variety i be
~ qx;i = ￿ ￿ ￿ kx ￿ ik (1)
(with ￿ and ￿ constants). We say that x is in the market for design a if
~ qx;a > 0. The market is therefore bounded by types ￿ x such that k￿ x ￿ ak =
￿=￿. Letting r ￿ ￿=￿, the market can be described as the ball B (a;r).
It is often reasonable to assume that individuals consume at most one
variety: one cannot visit two parks simultaneously and may always prefer
the same one when facing the choice repeatedly over a period of time. To





if kx ￿ ik ￿ minj6=i kx ￿ jk; kx ￿ ik < r
else
; (2)
and say that x is in the demand set for design a if qx;a > 0. (I.e. if a is
strictly the closest variety for x, and ~ qx;a > 0.) When varieties are clustered
somewhere in the space, a￿ s demand set may be strictly contained in a￿ s
6Figure 2: Demand for a in L2
market. Illustrations in Euclidean and L1 space follow for two designs a
and b. Because these cases reappear throughout the paper, we explain the
peculiarities of demand in L1 with some care.
In Euclidean space (L2), the set of types who prefer a to b is a half-
space separated by a hyperplane. In Figure 2, a￿ s demand set is then the
(shaded) intersection of the market B (a;r) with the halfspace to the left
of the line. The hyperplane passes through the intersection of the mar-
ket boundaries: a shared boundary point ￿ x satis￿es q￿ x;a = 0 = q￿ x;b, hence
k￿ x ￿ ak = ￿=￿ = k￿ x ￿ bk, which is indi⁄erence in the example. This prop-
erty of the indi⁄erent set is general (and independent of the metric) when
the model is consistent with transitive preferences. If x￿ s opportunity cost of
participation (value of not consuming any variety of the good) is c, then if x
is indi⁄erent between a and c (in a￿ s market boundary), and between b and
c (in b￿ s market boundary), x must be indi⁄erent between a and b.
While the geometry of Euclidean space is rotation-invariant, the same is
not true of spaces endowed with other norms. Figure 3 depicts the four cases
arising with L1 and congruent markets.As idiosyncratic as the indi⁄erent sets
look, they arise from the same three principles.
7Figure 3: Demand for a in L1
8(1) At points x in the indi⁄erent set such that min(a1;b1) ￿ x1 ￿
max(a1;b1) and x2 ￿ min(a2;b2) or x2 ￿ max(a2;b2), a vertical move away
from a is also a move away from b, so vertical moves away from center pre-
serve indi⁄erence. Analogously, at points x in the indi⁄erence set such that
x1 ￿ min(a1;b1) or x1 ￿ max(a1;b1) and min(a2;b2) ￿ x2 ￿ max(a2;b2),
horizontal moves away from center preserve indi⁄erence.
(2) At points x in the set such that min(a1;b1) ￿ x1 ￿ max(a1;b1) and
min(a2;b2) ￿ x2 ￿ max(a2;b2), moving away from a in an axis direction
entails moving toward b in that direction. To stay indi⁄erent, one must
compensate for a step away from a in one dimension with a step toward b in
the other. Hence the graph of the indi⁄erent set has slope 1 (is parallel to
the edges).5
(3) Points such that x1 < min(a1;b1) and x2 < min(a2;b2), or x1 >
min(a1;b1) and x2 > min(a2;b2) all rank a and b identically. Suppose x in
this region is indi⁄erent between a and b. Any other point in the region can
be reached by a series of steps in the axis directions, where every step is
away from a and b or towards both. Such moves cannot change the ordering
of a and b; they preserve indi⁄erence. Hence if one point in this region is
indi⁄erent, all of them are. This produces the thick indi⁄erent set in the
lower right panel of Figure 3.
Only the lower left panel of Figure 3, where a and b di⁄er in a single
dimension, resembles the Euclidean case. At the other extreme, the L1
geometry is a 45￿ rotated version of that in L1. The p-metrics with p 2 (1;2)
and p > 2 generate curved indi⁄erent sets that are topological analogues of
those in L1 and L1, respectively. The reader will at this point appreciate
that the Euclidean geometry is rather special. The paper explores the theme
repeatedly in examples from L1 as we discuss the limits of our results.
5This assumes a ￿ b and a ￿ b (that is, a is located southeast or northwest from b), as
in the diagrams. Else the slope is ￿1.
92 Demand
The piecewise linear demand function (2) belongs to a larger family that
shares the same aggregative geometry and is within the scope of our analysis.
Let￿ s ￿x some notation. A menu L lists the locations (a;b) 2 Rn ￿ Rn of
varieties the types may exclusively participate in.6 An individual action
is a pair of non-negative quantities or use frequencies ￿ 2 R2
+ such that
￿a > 0 ) ￿b = 0 and ￿b > 0 ) ￿a = 0. The choice set is therefore:
Q ￿ Qa [ Qb where Qi ￿ f(￿a;￿b) : ￿i ￿ 0;￿j6=i = 0g for i = a;b:
We refer to the actual demand of x (the most-preferred element of Q) by qx =
(qx;a;qx;b). In order to economize on notation, we￿ ll assume that preference
is always strict, so that the maximizers are unique.
The example in Section 1 implicitly referred to a zero-price "pure" pub-
lic good. The setting can be extended to "impure" public goods, which
may be excludable and aren￿ t necessarily free or uniformly priced. They are
distinguished from private goods only in that the provider￿ s objective is to
maximize a social bene￿t, rather than pro￿t. Examples of impure public
goods include community swimming pools, museums, schools and colleges,
and many more. Prices are often set to break even at given costs, or targeted
at a speci￿ed loss or gain.7
6The setting generalizes to many varieties, where one would reason inductively from
the two-variety case. Beyond the simple extension where every pair has at most one close
variety (so that one e⁄ectively works with two varieties), things get very complicated.
7Technically, our analysis covers situations where pricing is disassociated from variety
locations (the paper could be titled "Pure Location E⁄ects"). Even some competitive
situations satisfy this criterion. For example, Zhang [13] showed that Bertrand duopolists
have an incentive to announce price-matching policies. It is conceivable that ￿rms would
never ￿nd it optimal to adjust their prices if the product location changes, given the
anticipated response from competitors.
10We de￿ne type x￿ s "personal price" as8
￿ (x;i) ￿ kx ￿ ik + ￿i;
where ￿i 2 R is variety i￿ s nominal price. If personal price is substituted for
distance in (2), the market radius depends on price. The optimal demand for
variety i is ~ qx;i = ￿ ￿ ￿￿ (x;i), provided that ￿ (x;i) < ￿ (x;j). The market
is bounded by types ￿ x such that k￿ x ￿ ik = ￿=￿ ￿ ￿i.
Let individual demands satisfy two postulates:
(A3) If ￿ (x;i) ￿ ￿ (y;i) and ￿ (x;i) ￿ ￿ (x;j), then qx;i ￿ qy;i.
(A4) If ￿ (x;i) = ￿ (y;j) and ￿ (x;j) = ￿ (y;i), then qx;i = qy;j.
To justify these assumptions, we interpret personal price as a measure of
preference. (A3) says: if x prefers variety i more than y does, and moreover
does not prefer variety j to i, then x demands more of i than y does. Note
that the "moreover" quali￿cation must be made: if x preferred j to i, then
x could not also choose i. Yet y, who may be more farther from both i and
j, but prefer i, could reasonably choose a nonzero quantity of i. Such points
are easy to locate in Figures 2 and 3.
(A4) is an anonymity principle: only distances matter for choice, not
individual perspective or language. Suppose if y swapped the names of a
and b, y would prefer each as strongly as x. Then we should see qx;a = qy;b
(which implies qx;b = qy;a = 0, hence qx = qy). In e⁄ect, y mimics the choices
of x after "renaming" varieties so that y faces the same problem as x. Figure
4 depicts an instance of (A4). If a and b are locations of (otherwise identical)
free-to-enter parks, then x and y have parks at the same driving distances
from home. Their visiting patterns should be the same.
8In the terminology of spatial economics, ￿ is the "delivered price." The seemingly more
general variant ￿ (x;i) ￿ kx ￿ ik￿ + ￿i, where ￿ is constant "transport cost," is only a
rescaling since norms satisfy kx ￿ ik￿ = kx￿ ￿ i￿k.
11Figure 4: (A4) with equal prices
(A3) and (A4) are usually easy to verify. (A3) holds if qx;i > 0 only if
￿ (x;i) ￿ ￿ (x;j) and qx;i is decreasing in kx ￿ ik and ￿i for i = a;b. (A4)
requires that qx;i depends on x (only) through kx ￿ ik and kx ￿ jk. The
piecewise linear example in Section 1 obviously satis￿es these conditions.
Many admissible demands could be constructed in a similar fashion, with
qx;i nonlinear but monotonic in ￿ (x;i).
We demonstrate now that (A1)-(A4) generate demand sets that are con-
sistent with the geometry of Section 1, if a mild nontriviality condition is
added:
(A5) Within a ￿nite distance from i, there exist a type with
positive demand for i and a type with zero demand for i and j.
Lemma 1 establishes that x will not choose j over i if x￿ s personal price
of i is lower (and a partial converse).
Lemma 1 (A1)-(A4) imply: if ￿ (x;i) ￿ ￿ (x;j), then qx;i ￿ qx;j. Con-
versely, qx;i > 0 only if ￿ (x;i) ￿ ￿ (x;j).
Proof. Let ￿ (x;i) ￿ ￿ (x;j) and consider a "mirror point" y such that
￿ (y;i) = ￿ (x;j) and ￿ (y;j) = ￿ (x;i). Such a point exists in a normed
vector space; a general proof is found in the appendix (Lemma 7).9 By
9If ￿i = ￿j (for example, pure public goods), the argument is simple: let y = i + j ￿ x
and con￿rm the mirror properties by substituting for x in ki ￿ xk and kj ￿ xk.
12construction, y satis￿es the "if" clause in (A4), hence (i) qx;i = qy;j and (ii)
qx;j = qy;i. Moreover, since ￿ (y;j) ￿ ￿ (x;j) and ￿ (y;j) ￿ ￿ (y;i), we have
(iii) qy;j ￿ qx;j by (A3). If qx;j = 0, then the lemma holds. Suppose therefore
qx;j > 0. Then qy;j > 0 from (iii), which implies qx;i > 0 from (i). But one of
qx;i and qx;j must be zero, so there is a contradiction. Infer qx;j = 0, hence
qx;i ￿ qx;j.
If qx;i > 0, then qx;j = qy;i = 0 from (ii), so qx;i > qy;i. Suppose ￿ (x;i) >
￿ (x;j), hence ￿ (x;i) > ￿ (y;i) and ￿ (y;i) < ￿ (y;j), by construction of y.
(A3) requires qy;i ￿ qx;i, again a contradiction. Hence ￿ (x;i) ￿ ￿ (x;j).
￿
Lemma 1 can be usefully restated if we de￿ne the halfspace
Hij ￿ fx : ￿ (x;i) ￿ ￿ (x;j)g
and recall that the demand set for variety i is
Di ￿ fx : qx;i > 0g:
The converse part of the lemma means Di ￿ Hij (since x 2 Di ) x 2 Hij).
Lemma 2 (A1)-(A5) imply: Di is nonempty and bounded.
Proof. Nonemptiness is immediate from (A5). From Lemma 1, Di ￿ Hij.
Suppose z is a point with zero demand for all varieties. If z 2 Hji for some
j 6= i, then a mirror point z0 2 Hij with zero demands can be found by Lemma
7 (appendix).10 Without loss then z 2 Hij. By (A5), kz ￿ ik is ￿nite, by (A3)
all x;z 2 Hij satisfy ￿ (z;i) ￿ ￿ (x;i) ) qz;i ￿ qx;i. Therefore qx;i = 0 for all
x beyond some ￿nite distance from i. It follows that Di = fx : qx;i > 0g is
bounded.
￿
10The point z0 satis￿es ￿ (z0;i) = ￿ (z;j) and ￿ (z0;j) = ￿ (z;i) by construction. There-
fore ￿ (z;i) ￿ ￿ (z;j) , ￿ (z0;i) ￿ ￿ (z0;j), or: z 2 Hji , z0 2 Hij.
13The payo⁄ from Lemmas 1 and 2 is the following characterization of
demand sets in our model. It provides the geometric basis for our subsequent
arguments.
Theorem 3 (A1)-(A5) imply: Di = B (i;r) \ Hij for some r.
Proof. Since Di is bounded by Lemma 2, r = supfkx ￿ ik : qx;i > 0g
exists. Because r is an upper bound, x 2 Di ( () qx;i > 0) only if
kx ￿ ik < r ( () x 2 B (i;r)). Hence Di ￿ B (i;r). From the converse of
Lemma 1, Di ￿ Hij; thus (i) Di ￿ B (i;r) \ Hij.
If x 2 B (i;r) \ Hij, then ki ￿ xk < r and x 2 Hij. Suppose x = 2 Di,
i.e. qx;i = 0. There exists x0 2 Hij such that ki ￿ xk < ki ￿ x0k < r, so by
(A3) qx0;i = 0. Now, for all x00 2 Hij with ki ￿ x00k ￿ ki ￿ x0k, (A3) implies
qx00;i ￿ qx0;i = 0. But then ki ￿ x0k is a bound of fkx ￿ ik : qx;i > 0g, and r
is not the least upper bound, a contradiction. We conclude x 2 Di, i.e. (ii)
B (i;r) \ Hij ￿ Di, which proves the claim.
￿
When (A4) applies, choices are equivalent in that x and y face essentially
the same problem and resolve it in the same way. If sx : Q ! R and
sy : Q ! R are surplus measures representing preferences of x and y,11 it
may be reasonable to impose:
(A6) Under the conditions of (A4), sx (qx) = sy (qy).
Strengthening (A4) in this way is plausible because the personal prices
of designs that x and y consume in equal quantities don￿ t di⁄er. Then the
choices should be valued the same. A more cautious view is that analogous
choices only re￿ ect the same preferences. Types who face similar problems
may agree on what is best, but they need not feel the same way about the
outcome. Then (A6) is not appropriate; one should only make the ordinal
assertion (A4) that choices are ranked similarly in similar situations.




) ￿ %x ￿
0 and sx (0) = 0.
14We refer to (A1)-(A5) as the weak system W. In this system we can
prove theorems about participation. In order to extend them to theorems
about surplus, we need the strong system (A1)-(A6), which we call S.
3 Isolated Varieties and Conservation of Ag-
gregates
We begin by studying the simplest possible situation that is relevant to our
problem: an isolated variety. Moving such a variety to a new location in
the design space turns out to be welfare-neutral. This should not come as
a surprise, since the uniformly populated space has no "special" points, and
utilitarian welfare measures like participation and surplus place equal weight
on all members of the population.
We are interested in two bene￿t measures for menus L = (a;b) of pure
public good varieties. The ￿rst is total participation, de￿ned as the sum of





In practice, a planner often has this criterion in mind, given that personal
enjoyment is typically not observed. One could think of participation as a
"revealed" preference indicator. In applied economics, surplus measures that
quantify actual value creation are important. Hence we also consider the





If a moves to a0 in isolation, there exists a bijective mapping between Da =
B (a;r) and Da0 = B (a0;r) such that the types paired by the mapping are
15equidistant from the varieties they consume, and so add equal participation
and surplus by (A4) and (A6).
Lemma 4 ("Conservation Lemma") Suppose a and a0 are points in a
normed vector space; B (a;r) and B (a0;r) are r-balls about these points.
There exists a bijective mapping f : B (a;r) ! B (a0;r) such that f (x) =
y only if ￿ (y;a) = ￿ (x;a0) and ￿ (x;a) = ￿ (y;a0). The restriction f :
B (a;r) \ Haa0 ! B (a0;r) \ Ha0a has the same property.
Proof. Our argument is by construction. Let
f (x) = a + a
0 ￿ x: (3)
We claim that f is a bijective map on (i) B (a;r) and (ii) B (a;r) \ Haa0,
into B (a0;r) and B (a0;r)\Ha0a respectively. In addition, we claim that (iii)
f (x) = y only if ky ￿ ak = kx ￿ a0k and ky ￿ a0k = kx ￿ ak. Since ￿a = ￿a0,
(iii) leads to ￿ (y;a) = ￿ (x;a0) and ￿ (y;a0) = ￿ (x;a).
Using (3) to substitute for x and f (x), we have
kx ￿ ak = ka
0 ￿ f (x)k; kf (x) ￿ ak = ka
0 ￿ xk: (4)
At this point, (iii) follows from the axiomatic property of norms that k￿xk =
j￿jkxk (let ￿ = ￿1).
To con￿rm that f (x) is one-to-one, it￿ s enough to show that it belongs to
the speci￿ed co-domains. Consider the domain (i) B (a;r). It is immediate
from kx ￿ ak = kf (x) ￿ a0k that kx ￿ ak ￿ r ) kf (x) ￿ a0k ￿ r, so f (x) 2
B (a0;r).
Moreover, since
kx ￿ ak ￿ kx ￿ a
0k = kf (x) ￿ a
0k ￿ kf (x) ￿ ak
follows from (4) and implies kx ￿ ak ￿ kx ￿ a0k , ky ￿ a0k ￿ ky ￿ ak, we
have x 2 Haa0 , f (x) 2 Ha0a. Therefore x 2 B (a;r) \ Haa0 entails f (x) 2
16Figure 5: "Conservation Lemma" illustrated for p = 2 and p = 1
B (a0;r)\Ha0a, so that f is also one-to-one on the domain (ii) B (a;r)\Haa0.
Because the inverse of f is one-to-one by analogous reasoning, f is onto and
bijective.
￿
Figure 5 illustrates the proof for k￿k1 and k￿k2. Intuitively, Lemma 4 re-
￿ ects the translation invariance of norms: the ball B (a0;r) can be constructed
from B (a;r) by subtracting a + a0 from every x 2 B (a;r) (and multiplying
by ￿1). Equivalently, observe that any x 2 B (a;r)\Haa0 (the dotted area in
Figure 5) is associated with a unique vector v such that x = a + v. A point
y 2 B (a0;r) \ Ha0a at the same distance from its preferred design can be
constructed as y = a0 ￿ v. Such a mapping is bijective and can be extended
to the whole ball B (a;r). While the result is quite intuitive in Euclidean
space, it holds in all normed vector spaces (even if the indi⁄erent set is thick
somewhere).
Applying (A4), the paired types x and y have equivalent demands: qx;a =
qy;b. If (A6) is enforced, this implies x and y gain equal satisfaction. Inte-
grating over the demand sets Da = B (a;r) and Da0 = B (a0;r), which are
















sy (qy)dy = V (b):
Location changes of an isolated variety are therefore welfare-neutral with
respect to participation and surplus.
The same statement applies to the integrals over B (a;r) \ Haa0 and
B (a0;r) \ Ha0a. Collected in the ￿rst of these sets are types who are dis-
advantaged when a is replaced by a0; the other set contains the bene￿ciaries.
The conservation lemma implies that losses and gains balance.12 This is the
key insight we take to the analysis of neighboring varieties.
4 Participation and Surplus with Neighbor-
ing Varieties
The argument that market overlap is wasteful is illustrated in Figure 6. Mov-
ing from a toward b, say to a0, generates three regions: (1) neutral types who
neither gain nor lose because of the move. This is the striped area. Note
that anyone who originally consumed b and still does after the move must
be neutral. (2) Types who are better o⁄. This includes anyone who switches
from b to a0 (they wouldn￿ t do so unless they could now do better than b)
and anyone now in the demand set of a0 who is closer to a0 than to a (i.e.
to the right of the dotted equistance line). This is the grey area. (3) Types
12There is a nice duality with competition among two varieties at a and b. The types
who end up closer to the design locus when it moves from a to a0 = b are the ones who
choose b over a when both are available. Hence the bene￿ts created by two competing
designs are equal.
18Figure 6: Closer varieties in Euclidean space
who are worse o⁄: anyone who originally consumed a and now drops out of
the market or is more distant from a0 than from a. This is the solid white
area.
The conservation lemma says that the portion of the ball B (a;r) that
lies in the halfspace Haa0 (to the left of the dotted equidistant line) creates
the same bene￿ts as the portion of the ball B (a0;r) that lies in the comple-
mentary halfspace Ha0a (to the right of the equidistance line). But some of
B (a0;r)\ Ha0a is absorbed into b￿ s demand set (the blackened part of the
striped area). In other words, some types who bene￿t from the move because
they are close to a0 do not realize the bene￿t by consuming a0. Instead they
continue to prefer b and the bene￿t is lost. This makes the move toward b
welfare-reducing.
These observations suggest it is never a good thing for varieties to move
closer together. Consider moves from a that maintain the distance to b.
Figure 7 depicts the Euclidean and L1 cases in the top and bottom panels.
In the Euclidean case, bene￿t and loss areas correspond.13 But in L1
13Although the conservation lemma does not say that there exists a bijection from
B (a;r)\Haa0 \Hab to B (b;r)\Ha0a \Ha0b, the claim would be true (only) in Euclidean
space if kb ￿ ak = kb ￿ a0k. Then b belongs to the equidistance line between a and a0,
19Figure 7: Distance-preserving moves of a in L2 and L1
20the move to a0 causes an increase in the gain area (corresponding to the
black striped region), while the distance from b has not changed. According
to the conservation lemma, the light grey area and the union of the white
and black striped area yield the same participation and surplus. Since only
the white area favors the design at a, and it can be mapped to an identical
(strict) subset of the grey area, which prefers a0, the change is strictly welfare-
improving. There are nearby moves such that ka0 ￿ bk < ka ￿ bk that are
still bene￿cial.
So it￿ s possible for closer varieties to be strictly preferred by society.
Welfare is not directly linked to menu diversity. Instead we have a weaker
theorem which, combined with the special symmetry of Euclidean spaces,
implies that welfare is distance-monotonic in L2.
Theorem 5 Suppose L = (a;b) and L0 = (a0;b0), where a0 and b0 are strict
convex combinations of a and b. In W, P (L) > P (L0); in S, V (L) > V (L0).
Proof. Da0 [ Db0 ￿ Da [ Db implies P (L) > P (L0) in W and S, and
V (L) > V (L0) in S.14 Therefore it￿ s su¢ cient to show: if a0 = ￿1a+(1 ￿ ￿1)b
and b0 = ￿2a+(1 ￿ ￿2)b with ￿1;￿2 2 (0;1), then Da0[Db0 ￿ Da[Db. Since
Da [ Db = B (a;r) [ B (b;r) and Da0 [ Db0 = B (a0;r) [ B (b0;r), we have
Da0 [ Db0 ￿ Da [ Db , B (a;r) [ B (b;r) ￿ B (a
0;r) [ B (b
0;r)
, B (a
0;r) \ B (b
0;r) ￿ B (a;r) \ B (b;r):
Given B (a;r) and B (b;r), denote the direction from a toward b by the
vector d ￿ (b ￿ a)=kb ￿ ak. Then every point x0 2 B (b;r) can be written
as x0 = x + ￿d for some x 2 B (a;r) and ￿xed ￿ = kb ￿ ak. In particular,
y0 = y + ￿d in the boundary of B (b;r) is the image of y in the boundary
which is an axis of symmetry between B (a;r) \ Haa0 \ Hab and B (b;r) \ Ha0a \ Ha0b.
14Since all types in Da [ Db have positive demands by de￿nition, Da0 [ Db0 ￿ Da [ Db
entails P (L) > P (L0). Moreover, incremental surplus from these demands must be non-
negative; else they are not optimal choices. Thus V (L) > V (L0).
21Figure 8: Construction of y0 and z in L2 and L1 space
of B (a;r). For a boundary point y of B (a;r), let z = y + K (y)d be the
farthest boundary point of B (a;r) in direction d such that K (y) ￿ 0. See
Figure 8 for examples in L2 and L1.
Observe that B (a;r) \ B (b;r) is the union of convex combinations of y0
and z, for all y such that ￿ ￿ K. So15
B (a;r) \ B (b;r) =
(
y ￿ (￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)K (y))d :
￿ 2 [0;1]; ￿ ￿ K (y); ka ￿ yk = r
)
:
If ￿ is larger, fewer y satisfy ￿ ￿ K (y); note that ￿ increases in the distance
between a and b. If a0 and b0 are convex combinations of a and b, then
kb ￿ ak ￿ kb0 ￿ a0k. Hence ￿0 in the location arrangement L0 is smaller
than ￿ in L and enlarges the intersection B (a0;r) \ B (b0;r). Therefore
B (a;r) \ B (b;r) ￿ B (a0;r) \ B (b;r), which is su¢ cient.
￿
The idea of the proof is that B (a;r)\B (b;r) increases as a approaches b
along a given line. Therefore the welfare loss from market overlap increases
when a0 is a convex combination of a and b (and b0 = b or b0 is itself a convex
15￿y0+(1 ￿ ￿)z = ￿(y ￿ ￿d)+(1 ￿ ￿)(y ￿ K (y)d) reduces to y￿(￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)K (y))d.
22Figure 9: B (a;r) \ B (b;r) increases if ka ￿ bk is reduced along ab
combination of a and b). In Figure 9, the striped area is the increase in
overlap from the move to a0.
The perfect symmetry of a ball in Euclidean space implies that "direction
doesn￿ t matter": for an arbitrary a0, every ~ a such that k~ a ￿ bk = ka0 ￿ bk
generates identical intersections and distance relationships. So if the distance
between a and b is reduced in any manner, there is an equivalent move that
satis￿es Theorem 5, hence is participation- and surplus-reducing.16 However,
other spaces do not exhibit such symmetry; the same argument does not
apply.
In general, a change to a public good menu is welfare-improving if it
di⁄erentiates all neighboring varieties equally in all features. Does the town
folk bene￿t if, a short walk from the historic center, an old square is renovated
in modern style? Not necessarily. If access and ￿ air are substitutes, some
patrons who used to come to the square from several blocks away lose interest.
16More precisely, in Euclidean space every arrangement L0 = (a0;b0) such that
ka0 ￿ b0k =
￿ ￿
￿~ a ￿~ b
￿ ￿




by a linear mapping and rotation
about ~ b. These are isomorphisms in a vector space. In particular, if k~ a ￿ bk < ka ￿ bk,
we can choose a convex combination L0 = (a0;b0) of L = (a;b), so Theorem 5 implies ~ L is
welfare-reducing.
23A few walk to the center instead; others just stay at home. There is a new
clientele who likes the modern design. But some of these people live near the
center and continue to go there. The balkers may not be fully replaced, so
that there is welfare loss from the move toward menu diversity. A solution is
to renovate a di⁄erent square that is farther from the center, that is develop
diversity in a balanced fashion.
5 On the Possibility of Pareto-Dominated De-
signs
A minimal e¢ ciency requirement for a menu change is that it does not make
everyone worse o⁄(and someone strictly so). By (A5) each variety has at least
one patron.17 It is tempting to assert that every menu with a ￿xed number
of varieties is Pareto-optimal. Any alternative arrangement must di⁄er in at
least one variety￿ s location, and there is a type who ideally preferred the orig-
inal variety. However, this type is not necessarily harmed. Consider Figure
10, set in a Euclidean space with qx;i = ￿￿￿￿ (x;i), ￿ (x;i) = ki ￿ xk
2 +￿i,
and ￿a > ￿b.
The move from a to a0 is ine¢ cient by the Pareto-criterion (the reverse
move would be Pareto-improving). Every type who demands b before and af-
ter a￿ s location change is neutral (in the striped area). In the drawn scenario,
the set of indi⁄erent types (the solid black line) shifts to the left (the broken
black line) after the move.18 No one switches from b to a. Every participant
who is closer to a0 than to a (to the right of the dotted grey line) previously
demanded b. (This set includes a￿ s target a0.) Therefore, the move has no
bene￿ciaries. But every participant in the white region is strictly worse o⁄.
The example depends critically on the restriction that individuals con-
17This property is of course preserved by, hence consistent with, anticonvex adjustments.
18The indi⁄erent set is linear with qx;i quadratic in distance between x and i; this is a
standard case in spatial and industrial economics.
24Figure 10: Pareto-domination in L2 with ￿ convex in k￿k
sume only one variety, for else a0 must bene￿t from having the ideal design
provided. It also requires b to be cheaper. When can we rule out Pareto-
domination if prices are possibly non-uniform? It turns out that linearity of
personal prices, which we already imposed, is enough.
Theorem 6 If design i attracts nonzero participation, then it cannot be
Pareto-dominated if the personal price ￿ is linear in the norm: ￿ (x;i) =
kx ￿ ik + ￿i.
Proof. To synchronize with our discussion, let i = a. A move from a to a0
is a Pareto-improvement if kx ￿ a0k ￿ kx ￿ ak for all x 2 Da. If a 2 Da, then
kx ￿ ak = 0 at x = a and the inequality holds only if a0 = a, i.e. there was no
move. Hence Pareto improvement is only possible if a = 2 Da = B (a;r)\Hab.
Suppose then that a = 2 Hab. So ￿ (a;b) < ￿ (a;a) () ￿b + ka ￿ bk <
￿a + ka ￿ ak = ￿a, which leads to19
(i) ka ￿ bk < ￿a ￿ ￿b:
19The inequality can be taken to be strict because else there exists a point y in B (a;r)\
Hab such that ky ￿ ak is arbitrarily small, hence a0 must be arbitrarily close to a (or y
su⁄ers by the change); in the limit, there is no move.
25Now take x 2 B (a;r)\Hab, which is nonempty by nonzero participation.
Since x chooses a over b, ￿ (x;b) ￿ ￿ (x;a) () ￿b+kx ￿ bk ￿ ￿a+kx ￿ ak,
hence:
(ii) kx ￿ bk ￿ kx ￿ ak ￿ ￿a ￿ ￿b:
With (i), (ii) implies
kx ￿ bk ￿ kx ￿ ak > ka ￿ bk: (5)
Since norms have the triangle property kx ￿ bk ￿ kx ￿ ak + ka ￿ bk, (??) is
not possible. Thus nonzero participation implies a 2 B (a;r) \ Hab. Every
move makes the type at a worse o⁄, so design a is not Pareto-dominated.
￿
What happens in Euclidean space with a linear personal price ￿? The
indi⁄erent set is nonlinear, as in the left panel of Figure 11, and a0 is always
in Ha0b. This creates the shaded area of types bene￿ting from the move to
a0, hence it is not Pareto-dominated.20 A corresponding example for L1 is
displayed in the right panel of Figure 11. The reader may check that the
indi⁄erence sets are drawn in accordance with the principles in Section 1.21
Again a0 2 Ha0b, so it cannot be dominated.
Some other scenarios in L1 appear in Figure 12. If B (a;r) is strictly
contained in B (b;r), then Da = ?, so Theorem 6 holds trivially in the
absence of participation in a.22
20To see where the proof of Theorem 6 fails if ￿ is nonlinear in the norm, return to the
"quadratic model" in Figure 10. The analogues of (i) and (ii), from ￿ (a;b) > ￿ (a;a) and
￿ (x;b) ￿ ￿ (x;a), are: (i) ka ￿ bk
2 < ￿a ￿ ￿b and (ii) kx ￿ bk
2 ￿ kx ￿ ak
2 ￿ ￿a ￿ ￿b.
Unlike in the case of a linear personal price, (i) and (ii) do not always con￿ ict. For some
x (that satisfy kx ￿ bk > kx ￿ ak), kx ￿ bk
2 ￿ kx ￿ ak
2 > ka ￿ bk
2 is consistent with the
triangle property of norms kx ￿ bk ￿ kx ￿ ak + ka ￿ bk.
21In particular, the dark grey triangles connected by a dotted line mark the types who
are equidistant from a and a0. The solid black line is the indi⁄erent set between a and b;
the partially coinciding broken black line that between a0 and b.
22For example if ￿a > ￿b and a = b, every type is equidistant from a and b and prefers
the cheaper variety (b).
26Figure 11: No Pareto-domination with ￿ linear in k￿k, L2 and L1
Figure 12: Additional examples of non-domination in L1
276 Conclusions with Reference to Literature
The population we model represents maximally heterogeneous tastes. Intu-
itively one expects that a public good menu with a given number of varieties
will yield greater bene￿ts (in terms of participation or surplus) if varieties
are more dispersed. The conjecture is ￿ awed: menus with neighboring vari-
eties (that "compete" for the same types) cannot be ranked by the distance
criterion. Euclidean spaces are a unique exception: if varieties move apart
in the Euclidean metric, participation and surplus increase. The paper can
be understood to demonstrate the special nature of the Euclidean example,
which tends to provide intuition. We argue that Euclidean spaces are no more
plausibe than others; they simply re￿ ect an intermediate complementarity
between features.
Welfare-monotonicity of anticonvex menu changes is ultimately consistent
with the intuition that maximally dispersed varieties are a solution to the
menu design problem. But the optimal direction from any given arrangement
is of practical interest when the planner is budget-constrained and adjust-
ments are costly. One wants to achieve the greatest welfare improvement
with a small outlay on a particular variety. Formally the question is: in
which direction should it be relocated? The bene￿t measure may be partici-
pation or surplus, and the change should be e¢ cient in the Pareto sense (not
everyone is against it).
Any "anticonvex" move (away from the neighboring variety along the
shared line) increases participation and surplus (and is Pareto-optimal if
personal prices are linear).23 The most interesting aspect is perhaps that
23Menu design with multiple neighboring varieties is a much more di¢ cult problem.
The optimal direction is a weighted sum of bilateral anticonvex directions, but the weights
cannot be equal unless individual demand functions are binary. With general individual
demand, it is not enough to minimize the total intersection with other markets. Patrons
who are closer to the locus of the rejected variety have greater potential use frequencies and
therefore fail to appropriate larger bene￿ts. They cannot be traded one-for-one against
more remote patrons.
28stronger claims are false. In practice, features are not equally malleable. A
park￿ s physical location can only be adjusted at prohibitive cost, but adding
a playground may be possible. (Note that this is not a quality change.
Some patrons may want quietude, so the playground is not universally pre-
ferred.) Our analysis cautions against the hypothesis that moving away from
other varieties (neighboring parks that have no playgrounds) in one feature
is welfare-improving. Say the park in question is also unique in o⁄ering a
rose bed. If quietude and the scent of roses are complements, the playground
could deter more visits than it attracts.
Related literatures on public good menus (or monopoly-provided private
good menus) almost unanimously support the notion that maximal disper-
sion is optimal. This is not surprising or inconsistent with our ￿ndings, as
these models are con￿ned to one-dimensional design spaces, where metrics
are equivalent and feature complementarity is not an issue. One-dimensional
spaces are meant to be consistent reductions of more realistic multidimen-
sional settings. But we have demonstrated that subtleties are lost in the
simpli￿cation, and induction from one-dimensional spaces can be quite mis-
leading. It may be worthwhile to reexamine formally similar research under
this aspect.
Welfare-maximizing locations of public good varieties have been discussed
in the context of social choice theory. Faced with a menu of alternatives
(points in an interval), individuals select the preferred one. There exists a
"peak" point for every individual such that closer alternatives to the peak
are always preferred. The problem is to ￿nd menus that satisfy e¢ ciency
and consistency criteria. Miyagawa [8] showed that the only solutions that
satisfy both Pareto optimality and a fairness restriction for two varieties are
the "left-peaks" and "right-peaks" rules. They place the varieties at the two
smallest (distinct) peaks or the two largest (distinct) peaks in the popula-
tion. Ehlers [3], [4] modi￿ed Miyagawa￿ s problem and found support for
the "extreme-peaks" rule which places varieties at the smallest and largest
29locations that are peaks in the population. This is also the only admissi-
ble rule if Nash￿ s and Arrow￿ s independence axioms are imposed instead of
fairness (Ehlers [2]). The "extreme-peaks" rule is similar to o⁄ering two re-
mote designs; it formalizes the basic intuition one has about the menu design
problem.
In ranking ￿scal policies, all individuals prefer a high-quality public good.
Yet they are actually o⁄ered a bundle of service and personal cost. Valua-
tion of services may vary, so there can be disagreement about the ideal level
of taxation. In theory, individuals move to the jurisdiction where the most
acceptable tax policy is in force or achievable through voting. This is for-
mally equivalent to participating in the preferred variety of a public good.
Perroni and Scharf [10] study this problem with individually preferred tax
policies distributed uniformly on the real line. Jurisdictions are elements of a
partition of the line, hence everyone participates in one variety of the public
good. In equilibrium, jurisdictions are of equal size and select the median
policy by majority voting. Hence varieties are evenly spaced along the line;
this is surplus-optimal given jurisdiction size.
The same type of result is common in the industrial economics literature
on multi-store monopoly. Under typical assumptions, one location arrange-
ment is no more costly to the monopolist than another, for a ￿xed number of
plants. If consumers bear the transport cost and the monopolist can partially
appropriate the bene￿ts of reducing it, the monopolist places the plants as a
planner would. If consumers are uniformly distributed in a one-dimensional
space, as in Katz [5], Pal and Sarkar [9], or Matsumura [7], even spacing of
stores occurs in equilibrium. This is another "maximum dispersion" result
with many varieties (in￿nitely many if the line is unbounded). Under cost
constraints and with a history, the menu may have a ￿xed number of vari-
eties with prior locations that can only be changed gradually and slightly.
Our analysis shows that moving toward even spacing (maximum dispersion)
is not necessarily best.
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A Appendix: Existence of a Mirror Point
Lemma 7 For every x in the normed vector space (Rn;k￿k) there exists y
such that ￿ (y;i) = ￿ (x;j) and ￿ (y;j) = ￿ (x;i).
Proof. Using the de￿nition of ￿, the claim is that there exists y with the
properties
ky ￿ ik = kx ￿ jk ￿ ￿i + ￿j (6)
ky ￿ jk = kx ￿ ik + ￿i ￿ ￿j: (7)
Equivalently, the intersection of the closed balls
Yi = f~ y : k~ y ￿ ik ￿ kx ￿ jk ￿ ￿i + ￿jg
and
Yj = f~ y : k~ y ￿ jk ￿ kx ￿ ik + ￿i ￿ ￿jg
is nonempty. Refer to Figure 13 for an illustration with the Euclidean metric.
Consider the line space through i and j, i.e. the a¢ ne combinations
~ y (￿) = ￿i + (1 ￿ ￿)j, ￿ 2 R. Elements in the intersection with Yi satisfy:
k~ y (￿) ￿ ik = (1 ￿ ￿)ki ￿ jk ￿ kx ￿ jk￿￿i+￿j, or ￿ ￿ 1￿
kx ￿ jk ￿ ￿i + ￿j
ki ￿ jk
:
32Figure 13: Construction of y with ￿(y;a) = ￿(x;b); ￿(y;b) = ￿(x;a)
Hence
￿ = 1 ￿
kx ￿ jk ￿ ￿i + ￿j
ki ￿ jk
is the greatest ￿ such that ~ y (￿) 2 Yi.
Elements in the intersection of the line space with Yj satisfy:
k~ y (￿) ￿ jk = ￿ki ￿ jk ￿ kx ￿ ik + ￿i ￿ ￿j;
or
￿ ￿
kx ￿ ik + ￿i ￿ ￿j
ki ￿ jk
=
kx ￿ ik + kx ￿ jk ￿ ki ￿ jk
ki ￿ jk
+ 1 ￿
kx ￿ jk ￿ ￿i + ￿j
ki ￿ jk
=





kx ￿ ik + kx ￿ jk ￿ ki ￿ jk
ki ￿ jk
+ ￿
denote the smallest element such that ~ y (￿) 2 Yj.
33The triangle inequality ensures that kx ￿ ik + kx ￿ jk ￿ ki ￿ jk ￿ 0;




is nonempty. But the ~ y (￿) on
this interval belong to Yi \ Yj, which implies that the boundary of Yi \ Yj is
nonempty and a solution to (6) and (7) exists.
￿
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